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PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS - MALPRACTICE - REMOVAL OF SWABS
BY SURGEON - REs IPsA LoQUITUR - Defendant surgeon failed to remove a
swab 1 from deceased's body after a major abdominal operation, relyipg in part
on the accuracy of the count made by the head theatre nurse, employed by the
hospital in which the operation occurred.2 In a suit by the mother of deceased
against defendant for his alleged negligence, held, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies, necessitating an explanation by defendant, but it is for the jury
to decide on the evidence in the entire case whether defendant's conduct con-

A gauze pad used to pack off adjacent organs from the area of the operation.
It was proved that the regular efficient hospital system for checking on the swabs
was followed, and that the nurse replied affirmatively to defendant's question as to
whether all the swabs had been accounted for prior to the closing of the wound.
1

2
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stituted a breach of his duty to use due care in performing the operation. Mahon
-u. Osborne, [1939] 2 K. B. 14.
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the principal case,
while not novel on such facts, 8 is notable for its effect on plaintiff's presentation
of his case. Through application of this doctrine after plaintiff has connected
defendant with a certain fact situation, defendant may be called on to sustain
the burden of proof as to his non-negligence, to rebut plaintiff's prima fade
case, or merely to offer some evidence in explanation of the inference of negligence raised against him.~ The latter effect of the doctrine, adopted by the court
in the case under discussion, 5 seems the wisest one to apply if the doctrine is to
be used in these "swab cases." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is generally not
raised unless the thing causing the injury was in the control of defendant, and
the injury is of the type that in the experience of mankind does not ordinarily
happen in the absence of negligence.6 It is debatable whether an injury sustained
through a swab overlooked in an operation can be said to be of this type in view
of the complexity of a major•operation, the difficulties and requirements of which
are not apparent to the man in the street.7 So if the doctrine is said to apply in
a "swab case" 8 it seems that the least burden possible under it should be placed·
on defendant surgeon, with his duty satisfied by surgical evidence explaining
the details of the operation.9 The principal case follows the general trend in
8 Ault v. Hall, II9 Ohio St. 422, 164 N. E. 518 (1928) (failure to remove a
sponge from patient's body after an operation held prima facie evidence of negligence);
Davis v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 A. 1007 (1913) (in action against surgeon for leaving
a gauze pad in patient, held the burden is on defendant to prove he was not negligent);
Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N. E. 312 (1932) (same). See also Sellers v.
Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923) (needle left in patient operated on by defendant).
' Heckel and Harper, "Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur," 22 ILL.
L. REV. 724 (1928).
5 Two of the three judges, MacKinnon and Goddard, agreed that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applied to the case, limiting its effect as indicated, while Scott, L. J.,
felt the doctrine could have no application in a field where there was no common
experience as to whether the action ordinarily involved negligence or not.
6 HARPER, ToRTS, § 77, at p. 183 (1933).
7 On the other hand, for these very reasons plaintiff in such a case can know
little of the transaction, whereas the necessary information is in possession of defendant,
who for practical reasons should perhaps be required to divulge it. It is obvious that
despite his lack of knowledge, the layman, rather excusably, feels something is wrong
where a foreign object has been inadvertently left by the surgeon in the body of one
operated upon.
8 In Guell v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N. E. 451 (1928), the court expressly
ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply where a surgeon, performing
an operation with hospital nurses assisting, failed to remove a sponge from the body
cavity before closing the incision, saying "no inference of negligence" could arise on
such facts against the surgeon.
9 But it has been held that a surgeon's failure to remove a sponge used in the
operation, before sewing up the incision, is negligence per se. Wynne v. Harvey, 96
Wash. 379, 165 P. 67 (1917); Moore v. Ivey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 264 S. W.
283.
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holding the surgeon to the standard of care of the ordinarily good and careful
pr~ctitioner in those circumstances.10 Thus it is left to the jury to determine
whether under all the circumstances of the particular operation, the surgeon
has breached his duty to exercise such care.11 The reply of_ the hospital nurse
that all swabs hav!! been removed,1 2 the observance of the customary efficient
system in the hospital to check on all swabs used in the operation, and the condition of the patient and necessity for haste are all factors to be considered by the
jury in determining whether defendant surgeon has exercised the requisite degree
of care, with no one factor conclusive of the case.18 It is submitted that the court
in the principal case acted wisely in rejecting a rigid standard of duty that the
surgeon remove all swabs used in the operation, and probe with his fingers in
search before closing the incision.

10 Walker v. Holbrook, 130 Minn. 106, 153 N. W. 305 (I<J.15); Akridge v.
Noble, 114 Ga. 949, 41 S. E. 78 (1902); Rayburn v. Day, 126 Ore. 135, 268 P.
1002 (1928); Roark v. Peters, 162 La. I II, no So. 106 (1926); Cassingham v.
Berry, 67 O~a. 134, 150 P. 139, 168 P. 1020 (1915).
11 A discussion of the case of Stawicki v. Kelley, n3 N. J. L. 551, 174 A. 896
(1934), in 15 BoST. UNIV, L. REV. 184 (1935), results in the conclusion that all of
the circumstances of the particular operation should be weighed by the jury in deter-:mining whether it was negligence for the surgeon to leave a sponge in the patient upon
whom he had operated.
12 Most cases hold that her answer that all swabs or sponges have been accounted
for cannot relieve the surgeon, of itself, from liability for his failure to remove any
swab, though it is a circumstance to be considered in determining if the surgeon's
omission was negligence. Paro v. Carter, 177 Wis. 121, 188 N. W. 68 (1922);
Cassingham v. Berry, 67 Okla. 134, 150 P. 139, 168 P. 1020 (1915); Barnett's
Admr. v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S. W. 461 (1915); Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind.
170, 183 N.·E. 312 (1932); Walker v. Holbrook, 130 Minn. 106, 153 N. W.
305 (1915).
13 See 15 BOST. UNIV. L. REV. 184 (1935); Walker v. Holbrook, 130 Minn.
106, 153 N. W. 305 (1915); Cassingham v. Berry, 67 Okla. 134, 150 P. 139, 168
P. 1020 (1915); Rayburn v. Day, 126 Ore. 135, 268 P. 1002 (1928).

